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Hyman  (Hy)  Minsky  was  born  in  Chicago  on  September  23  1919  and  died  in  Rhinebeck, 
New  York,  after  a year’s  battle  with  pancreatic  cancer,  on  October  24,  1996.  The  influence  of 
Oscar  Lange,  Paul  Douglas,  Jacob  Viner,  Frank  Knight  and  Henry  Simons,  all  members  of 
the  University  of  Chicago  economics  faculty  in  1937  when  Hyman  Minsky  was  an 
undergraduate  there,  played  a pivotal  role  in  reinforcing  his  interest  in  studying  economics, 
even  though  his  B.S.  degree  was  in  mathematics.  The  courses  and  seminars  taught  by  the 
“Chicago  greats,”  his  friendship  with  Gerhard  Meyer  and  Abba  Lerner  as  well  as  the 
socioeconomic  environment  of  his  youth  contributed  to  Hy’s  decision  to  further  his  education 
in  economics,  which  he  did  (after  a number  of  years  of  involvement  in  the  U.S.  Army  serving 
in  New  York,  Britain  and  Germany)  at  Harvard,  from  which  he  earned  his  master’s  and 
doctoral  degrees.  (Minsky  1985)  At  Harvard,  he  asked  Joseph  Schumpeter  to  be  his  doctoral 
supervisor,  which  surprised  Alvin  Hansen,  since  Hy  had  been  his  teaching  assistant  for  the 
money  and  banking  course  which  Hansen  taught.  As  it  turned  out,  however,  Hy  finished  the 
thesis  in  1954  under  Wassily  Leontief  because  of  Schumpeter’s  untimely  death.  In  his 
dissertation,  and  in  later  research,  Hy  explored  the  interrelationships  among  market  structure, 
banking,  the  determinants  of  aggregate  demand,  and  business  cycle  performance. 
Many  of  his  Chicago  friends  and  other  acquaintances  had  moved  to  the  Harvard-MIT 
community,  but  he  never  saw  Harvard  as  his  intellectual  home.  To  him,  the  intellectual 
powerhouse  was  the  University  of  Chicago,  which  continued  to  influence  him  during  the 
Harvard  days.  It  was  Chicago  that  he  would  visit  with  every  chance  he  had  to  renew  his 
friendship  with  Carl  Christ,  Leonid  Hurwicz  and  other  remaining  friends  at  the  University  and 
1 the  Cowles  Commission,  and  to  meet  new  friends  including  Kenneth  Arrow.  The  classes  and 
seminars  at  Harvard  were  not  challenging  for  they  lacked  the  rigor  and  clarity  of  those  at 
Chicago.  The  self-appointed  American  disciples  of  Keynes--Alvin  Hansen  leading  them-- 
were  content  with  the  conventional  and  almost  mechanistic  interpretation  of  countercyclical 
fiscal  policy,  ignoring  the  significance  of  uncertainty  and  the  role  that  money  and  finance 
played  in  a complex  capitalist  system.  Hy’s  refusal  to  accept  this  narrow  and  fundamentally 
incorrect  interpretation  of  Keynes,  which  necessarily  led  to  a  simplistic  belief  that  market 
behavior  can  be  neutralized  by  interventions  affecting  aggregate  demand,  played  a  significant 
role  in  his  later  research  and  writings. 
His  first  academic  appointment  was  in  the  faculty  of  Brown  University  where  he  was 
tenured  and  promoted  to  associate  professor.  He  moved  to  the  University  of  California  at 
Berkeley  in  1957,  after  having  spent  a sabbatical  year  there,  two  years  earlier,  which  turned 
into  an  offer  for  a permanent  appointment.  During  his  years  at  Berkeley,  Hy  developed  his 
ideas  about  the  importance  of  cash  flows  in  contractual  commitments  in  that  current 
borrowing  is  obtained  by  committing  future  cash,  a perspective  not  considered  in  the 
traditional  flow  of  funds  analysis.  (Minsky  1963b)  At  Berkeley,  he  felt  very  pleased  to 
of  the  economics  program,  which  was  distinctive  in  that  it  offered  a broad  spectrum  of 
courses  taught  by  a good  group  of  faculty.  As  the  years  went  by,  however,  he  became 
disillusioned  with  the  changes  that  were  occurring  that  tilted  the  economics  program 
increasingly  to  an  emphasis  in  mathematics.  To  be  sure,  he  once  confided,  the  years  at 
Berkeley  were  very  productive  --his  John  Maynard  Keynes  book  was  conceived  during 
be part 
that 
time.  Also,  while  at  Berkeley,  he  instituted  a banking  seminar  sponsored  by  Bank  of  America, 
2 which  helped  sharpen  his  knowledge  of  institutional  innovation  in  banking  and  of  the  details 
of  a bank’s  internal  operations--which  proved  very  valuable  later  when  he joined  the  board  of 
the  Mark  Twain  Banks  in  St.  Louis.  Moreover,  the  Berkeley  years  were  rewarding  in  that  a 
number  of  his  honors  students  --Victoria  Chick,  Peter  Gray,  Robert  Hall,  Thomas  Sargent-- 
have  distinguished  themselves  in  the  economics  profession  and  beyond.’  In  the  turbulent 
1964-65  year  of  campus  unrest  at  Berkeley, 
Washington  University  in  St.  Louis  seemed 
he  admitted, 
the  decision  to  accept  a permanent  appointment  at 
a good  opportunity  at  least  for  the  near  term.  As 
I  frankly  went  to  Washington  University  with  no  intention  of  spending  twenty-five 
years  there.  I thought  I’d  go  there,  get  some  things  done  and  get  out.  But,  I  got 
involved  with  the  banks  [Mark  Twain]  and  when  the  offer  came  through  from 
the  State  University  [New  York],  two  or  three  years  later,  the  bank  made  it 
worthwhile  to  stay.  This  happened  a couple  of  times  (Quoted  from  Fazzari  and 
Papadimitriou  1992). 
On  his  retirement  in  1990  from  Washington  University,  as  an  Emeritus  Professor,  he  became 
a Distinguished  Scholar  at  the  Jerome  Levy  Economics  Institute  of  Bard  College,  where  he 
remained  until  his  death. 
Hy’s  work  represents  one  of  the  most  important  links  between  Post  Keynesians  and 
Institutionalists.  We  begin,  in  this  essay,  with  a brief  summary  of  some  of  his  earlier  work, 
including  his  well-known  “financial  instability  hypothesis”  and  his  policy  proposals  that  were 
designed  to  reform  the  financial  system,  but  pay  more  attention  to  his  writings  that  explore 
other  analysis  and  policy  proposals  that  are  less  well  known.  These  have  been  for  the  most 
3 part  developed  in  the  later  years,  after  the  publication  of  his  Stabilizing  an  Unstable  Economy 
(1986)  book,  and  during  his  association  with  the  Levy  Institute. 
Hy  did  not  like  to  be  labeled  “Post  Keynesian”;  this  was  probably  for  three  reasons. 
First,  he  believed  that  a more  accurate  description  of  his  approach  was  “financial  Keynesian”, 
for  this  singled  out  his  debt  to  Keynes  while  focusing  on  what  he  believed  to  be  his 
clarification  of,  and  extension  to,  the  economics  of  Keynes,  namely,  the  addition  of  complex 
financial  relations,  markets,  and  institutions.  Second,  he  wanted  to  distance  himself  from  a 
tendency  in  Post  Keynesian  economics  to  push  institutions  into  the  background  in  order  to 
develop  “general  theories”.  He  firmly  believed  that  general  theories  are  either  plainly  wrong, 
or  are  simply  too  general  to  be  of  any  use.  He  would  ask:  what  sort  of  economic  theory  can 
be  applied  equally  well  to  a tribal  society,  a peasant  economy,  a  small  government  capitalism, 
and  a big  government  capitalism  with  complex  financial  arrangements?  According  to  Hy, 
institutions  must  be  brought  into  the  analysis  at  the  beginning;  useful  theory  is  institution- 
specific.  (Minsky  1992d)  All  of  his  work  emphasized  that  our  economy  operates  within  a 
modern  capitalist  system  with  a big  government  sector,  with  long-lived  and  privately  owned 
capital,  and  with  exceedingly  complex  financial  arrangements. 
Finally,  as  all  who  knew  him  would  verify,  even  to  his  final  days  Hy  never  gave  up 
hope  that  communication  with  the  profession  is  possible.  While  he  was  convinced  that 
mainstream  analysis  is  not  only  wrong-headed,  but  that  it  is  also  dangerous  when  it  forms  the 
basis  of  policy  formation,  he  was  also  convinced  that  he  could  “move  the  discipline”--at  least 
a little.  This  conviction  was  amply  in  evidence  in  his  work  at  the  Jerome  Levy  Economics Institute,  for  otherwise  there  would  have  been  no  reason  to  attempt  to  influence  policy  and 
theory.  To  this  point,  we  will  return. 
Hy  had  little  use  for  pure  exercises  in  “history  of  thought”,  rather,  he  always  argued 
that  he  stood  “on  the  shoulders  of  giants”,  like  Keynes,  Schumpeter,  and  Simons.  (His  most 
famous  book,  John  Maynard  Keynes,  is,  of  course,  most  assuredly  not  about  Keynes.) 
Whether  he  got  their  theories  “right”  was  a matter  of  little  consequence  to  him,  for  he  used 
their  contributions  only  as  a  springboard  for  his  own  analysis.  Thus,  it  is  with  some 
trepidation  that  we  attempt  to  do  what  Hy  avoided  and  even  disdained:  to  lay  out  the  ideas  of 
a giant--and  surely  Hy  does  qualify  as  a giant  on  whose  shoulders  we  can  stand.  However,  we 
note  that  he  did  enjoy  being  the  topic  of  analysis  and  was  always  kind  to  authors  even  when 
they  got  Minsky  “wrong”.  Thus,  we  have  reason  to  believe  that  he  would  have  enjoyed  the 
following,  even  where  it  may  be  flawed.  We  only  wish  we  could  have  his  reply. 
ON  BECOMING  A  MINSKIAN 
There  has  been  some  controversy  over  “early”  Minsky  versus  “later”  Minsky,  with  some 
arguing  that  Minsky’s  early  work  was  essentially  orthodox  and  that  he  really  did  not  become 
a Post  Keynesian  until  the  1970~.~ Indeed,  Minsky  told  one  of  the  authors  (Wray)  that  he 
only  very  gradually  became  a  “Minskian”,  with  the  transformation  completed  in  his  John 
Maynard  Keynes.  We  do  not,  however,  completely  agree  with  this  view,  even  if  it & 
Minsky’s  view.  As  noted  above,  Minsky  traced  his  intellectual  heritage  primarily  to  Chicago’s 
Lange,  Viner,  Knight,  and  Simons  (and  to  Harvard’s  Schumpeter),  rather  than  to  the  Harvard 
“Keynesians”.  It  might  appear  somewhat  incongruous  to  claim  that  this  heritage  is !ess 
5 orthodox  than  the  prevailing  “Keynesian”  tradition,  but  it must  be  remembered  that  Chicago 
in  the  1940s  was  not  the  post-Friedman  Chicago  of  today.  What  Minsky  took  away  from 
Chicago  (and  particularly  from  Simons)  was  the  view  “that  market  structures  matter  in 
determining  both  efficiency  and  the  efficacy  of  aggregate  interventions”,  thus,  rejecting  the 
Harvard  notion  that  analysis  could  ignore  market  structure  as  it  focused  on  control  of  the 
economy  through  aggregate  interventions.  (Papadimitriou  1992,  pp.  18-19)  This  was  Minsky’s 
dissertation  theme,  which  had  explored  the  relations  between  market  structure  and  aggregate 
demand,  with  a special  emphasis  on  banking  and  investment  decisions. 
Minsky’s  first  important  publication  (Minsky  1957a)  related  institutional  innovation  to 
profit  opportunities,  demonstrating  how  innovation  allows  business  activity  to  expand  even  in 
the  absence  of  expansionary  monetary  policy.  He  showed  how  the  development  of  the  federal 
funds  market  allowed  a given  quantity  of  aggregate  reserves  to  support  a greater  expansion  of 
deposits,  and  how  repurchase  agreements  allowed  a given  quantity  of  demand  deposits  to 
support  a greater  volume  of  loans.  He  also  “endogenized”  innovation,  making  it  a  function  of 
profit-seeking  behavior.  As  the  central  bank  tightens  monetary  policy,  this  raises  interest  rates 
and  encourages  new  financial  practices  that  “stretch  liquidity”  as  liquid  balances  are  reduced. 
This  means  that  tight  monetary  policy  may  not  reduce  the  money  supply  (or  even  reduce  the-- 
more  broadly  defined--supply  of  credit)  as  higher  interest  rates  encourage  banks  to  seek  new 
ways  of  providing  finance.  At  the  same  time,  these  innovations  increase  the  potential  for 
instability  because  “every  institutional  innovation  which  results  in  both  new  ways  to  finance 
business  and  new  substitutes  for  cash  assets  decreases  the  liquidity  of  the  economy”.  (Minsky 
1957a  p.  184)  Minsky  argued  that  early  in  an  expansion,  the  supply  curve  of  credit  would  be 
6 highly  elastic  so  that  rising  demand  for  credit  would  not  have  much  effect  on  interest  rates 
(but  would  instead  increase  the  supply  of  credit).  However,  later  in  the  boom,  as  liquidity 
falls  and  the  possibility  of  default  increases,  the  supply  curve  becomes  more  inelastic  so  that 
rising  demand  raises  interest  rates.  This,  in  turn,  can  induce  further  innovation,  and  further 
fragility.3  This  raises  the  possibility  of  a rapid  deflation  of  value  of  assets  should  some  firms 
or  households  fail  to  meet  contracted  commitments.  Ultimately,  the  monetary  authorities 
might  be  called  upon  to  halt  a debt  deflation  process  by  intervening  as  a  lender  of  last  resort 
to  increase  the  quantity  of  liquidity  by  accepting  (at  the  discount  window)  illiquid  assets. 
(Minsky  1957a,  p.  185)  Thus,  even  in  his  first  important  publication,  we  find  many  of  the 
ideas  that  show  up  later  in  his  work:  endogenous  money,  innovation  that  stretches  liquidity, 
behavioral  changes  induced  by  policy,  lender  of  last  resort  activity,  and  instability-enhancing 
behavior  over  the  course  of  the  cycle.  We  return  to  these  aspects  of  his  analysis  below. 
Minsky  also  tried  to  extend  the  conventional  multiplier-accelerator  analysis  to  take 
account  of  monetary  variables  and  financial  institutions  in  his  next  two  major  publications.  He 
bemoaned  the  fact  that  “authors  who  have  constructed  these  accelerator-multiplier  models 
have  paid  little,  if  any,  attention  to  the  monetary  pre-requisites  and  effects  of  the  assumed 
processes.”  (Minsky  1957b,  p.  859)  He  argued  that  Samuelson’s  multiplier-accelerator  model 
could  be  applied  only  to  “small  oscillations”  which  are  neither  great  enough  to  disturb  the 
accelerator  or  multiplier  coefficients,  nor  great  enough  to  lead  to  imposition  of  new  initial 
conditions;  in  other  words,  the  model  was  valid  only  if  cyclical  growth  of  income  and 
production  were  to  occur  without  affecting  behavior  or  inducing  institutional  innovation. (Minsky  1959)  Thus,  in  Minsky  (1957b),  he  “endogenized”  the  coefficients,  and  in  Minsky 
(1959),  he  allowed  for  changes  of  initial  conditions. 
He  argued  that  “[t]he  terms  (interest  rate)  and  the  manner  (type  of  liability)  of 
financing  investment  are  affected  by  the  behavior  of  the  monetary  system.  In  turn,  both 
money-market  conditions  and  the  balance-sheet  structure  of  firms  affect  the  response  of  firms 
to  a change  in  income.  This  can  be  interpreted  as  making  the  accelerator  coefficient  an 
endogenous  variable  related  to  the  monetary  system.”  (Minsky  1957b,  p.  869)  He  thus 
considered  “the  following  alternative  monetary  systems:  (A)  neither  velocity  nor  quantity 
changes;  (B)  only  velocity  changes;  (C)  only  quantity  changes;  (D)  both  velocity  and  quantity 
change.‘14 (Minsky  1957b,  p.  863)  He  demonstrated  that  if  an  expansion  takes  place  on  the 
basis  of  an  increase  of  the  money  supply,  then  the  balance  sheet  positions  of  firms  worsen. 
However,  if  both  velocity  and  the  money  supply  tend  to  rise  over  the  course  of  an  expansion, 
the  “rise  in  velocity  tends  to  counteract  the  deterioration  of  firms’  balance  sheets  in  a 
business-cycle  expansion  financed  by  bank  creation  of  money.”  (Minsky  1957b,  p.  881)  A 
decline  in  liquidity  preference  of  the  household  sector  can  serve  as  an  alternative  to  expansion 
of  the  money  supply,  in  effect  “improving  financing  terms  and  [...I  decreasing  the  dependence 
of  business  firms  upon  bank  financing,  rais[ing]  the  accelerator  coefficient.  A  great  stock- 
market  boom,  such  as  in  the  late  1920’s,  may  be  interpreted  as  reflecting  a lowering  of 
liquidity  preferences;  as  a result  business  expansion  could  be  financed  with  less  reliance  upon 
the  banking  system  than  otherwise.“’  (Minsky  1957b,  p.  881)  On  the  other  hand,  rising 
liquidity  preference  during  a downswing  would  cause  a deterioration  of  firms’  balance  sheets, 
inducing  a  further  fall  of  investment.  Thus,  liquidity  preference,  money  supply  conditions,  and 
8 those  factors  that  affect  velocity  all  influence  the  financial  position  of  firms,  which  in  turn 
affects  investment  decisions  and  the  accelerator  process.  He  concluded  that 
[glovernment  deficits  financed  by  borrowing  from  banks  result  in  an  increase  int  he 
money  supply  without  any  corresponding  increase  in  business  debt.  [...]This  is more 
conducive  to  steady  growth  [...I  Therefore  government  deficit  financing,  even  during  a 
period  of  sustained  growth  and  secularly  rising  prices,  may  be  desirable  in  order  to 
maintain  the  conditions  for  further  growth.  (Minsky  1957b,  p.  883) 
We  will  return  below  to  Minsky’s  later  analysis  of  deficit  spending. 
Minsky  (1959)  reworked  this  model,  adding  “floors  and  ceilings”  that  imposed  “new 
initial  conditions”  on  the  model,  interpreted  as  “reflecting  effective  supply  constraints”. 
(Minsky  1959  pp.  133-4)  He  showed  that  the  time  path  of  income  generated  by  such  a  linear- 
accelerator  model  “can  generate  either  (a)  steady  growth,  (b)  cycles,  (c)  booms,  or  (d)  long 
depressions”.  (Minsky  1959,  p.  134)  He  demonstrated  that  “by  feeding  financial  and  money 
market  developments  into  the  formal  model  through  the  ratchet  in  the  consumption  function, 
booms  and  depressions  of  varying  amplitude  and  length  can  be  generated.”  (Minsky  1959,  p. 
135)  He  used  this  model  to  explain  the  robust  growth  that  followed  WWII:  forced  war-time 
saving,  highly  liquid  balance  sheets  (due  in  large  part  to  war-time  deficit  spending),  and 
exploitation  of  war-time  technological  change  and  accumulated  productive  capacity  led  to 
high  autonomous  consumption  and  high  potential  (“ceiling”)  output.  He  concluded  that 
Whenever  income  fell  away  from  the  ceiling--as  in  1948  and  1954  in  the  United 
States--the  financial  ease,  carried  over  from  the  war,  resulted  in  a relatively  high  and 
nonfalling  floor  in  income,  so  that  recovery  was  quick.  In  order  for  more  serious 
9 depressions  to  occur,  it  is  necessary  for  the  ratio  of  equilibrium  income  to  ceiling 
income  to  decrease  or  for  depreciation  ratios  to  increase....  [T]his  could  occur  if  the 
downturn  were  accompanied  by  a financial  crisis  or  if  the  preceding  boom  had  been 
associated  with  a relatively  small  increase  or  even  a decrease  in  the  liquid  asset 
position  of  households  and  firms.  (Minsky  1959,  p.  144) 
Thus,  these  early  articles  included  financial  positions  as  “initial  conditions”  that  would 
influence  the  path  of  the  economy--whether  that  be  tranquil  or  unstable--as  well  as  the 
position  Minsky  would  develop  later  that  the  US  economy  emerged  from  WWII  with  “robust” 
balance  sheets,  full  of  government  debt,  that  overtime  would  become  increasingly  fragile, 
generating  the  conditions  that  might  make  “It” (a  debt  deflation)  happen  again.  Admittedly, 
these  articles  tend  to  rework  and  extend  fairly  conventional  analysis,  however,  this  was  done 
in  directions  that  would  be  developed  over  the  next  several  decades  until  they  appeared  in 
more-or-less  finished  form  in  his  Stabilizing  an  Unstable  Economy  (1986)  book. 
In  the  intervening  years,  three  elements  were  added  to  the  analysis:  the  “financial 
theory  of  investment”  presented  in  John  Maynard  Keynes  (1975),  the  Kalecki-Levy  view  of 
profits,  and  the  “financial  instability  hypothesis”  (FIH).  In  the  remainder  of  this  section,  we 
will  briefly  discuss  the  first  two  elements,  leaving  the  FIH  for  the  next  section. 
Minsky’s  John  Maynard  Keynes  (1 975)6 grew  out  of  lectures  he  gave  at  Berkeley, 
discussions  with  Nicholas  Kaldor,  Frank  Hahn,  Donald  Winch,  Kenneth  Arrow,  and  Hollis 
Chenery  (some  taking  place  during  their  visits  to  Berkeley  and  during  a  seminar  organized  by 
Kaldor  at  Berkeley),  a  sabbatical  at  Cambridge  (1969-70,  where  he  was  able  to  develop  his 
views  in  discussion  with  Donald  Moggridge,  Jan  Kregel,  Joan  Robinson,  and  W.B. 
10 Reddaway),  his  work  during  the  1960s  on  the  FIH,  and  his  early  work  on  multiplier- 
accelerator  models.  The  main  contribution  made  by  this  book  is  the  “financial  theory  of 
investment”  which  springs  from  the  recognition  that  in  any  modern,  capitalist  society,  there 
are  “two  price  levels”:  one  for  “current  output”  and  another  for  “capital  assets”.  In  Minsky’s 
view,  the  demand  price  for  capital  assets  must  exceed  the  supply  price  before  investment  can 
take  place.  The  demand  price  for  assets  is  related  to  the  prospective  returns  from  ownership 
of  any  asset;  these  prospective  returns  “present  views  about  the  future,  and  therefore  are  prone 
to  change  as  views  about  the  future  change.”  (Minsky  1975,  p.  95)  The  supply  price  of  the 
capital  asset  depends  on  production  (thus,  on  “current  output  price”  of  investment  goods)  and 
finance  costs.  Minsky  built  Keynes’s  “lender’s  risk”  and  “borrower’s  risk”  into  the  model,  so 
that  demand  price  is  adjusted  (downward)  to  account  for  the  risk  to  the  borrower  of  exceeding 
“internal  funds”,  while  supply  price  is  adjusted  (upward)  to  take  account  of  the  increasing  risk 
to  the  lender  as  the  borrower  takes  on  greater  debt.  These  then  provide  a  “margin  of  security”, 
which  itself  is  subject  to  “whirlwinds”  of  optimism  and  pessimism  (the  margins  can  decline  in 
a boom,  or  rise  in  a bust).  Because  investment  is the  driving  variable  in  the  economy,  Minsky 
labeled  his  approach  “a financial  theory  of  investment  and  an  investment  theory  of  the  cycle”. 
Thus,  he  was  able  to  include  the  proposition  that  asset  positions  in  a capitalist  economy  are 
“financed”  positions,  and  the  view  that  financial  position  affects  behavior  in  ways  that  can  be 
destabilizing.  (More  on  this  below.) 
It  is  interesting  that  John  Maynard  Keynes  contains  no  reference  to  Kalecki;  when 
questioned,  Minsky  could  not  remember  when  he  first  adopted  the  Kaleckian  view  that 
investment  determines  profits,  but,  surely  if he  had  been  familiar  with  Kalecki’s  theory,  it 
11 would  have  appeared  in  the  book.  Later,  Minsky  would  make  great  use  of  the  “Kalecki-Levy” 
profit  equation,  which  is  derived  from  national  identities  and  shows  that  aggregate  profits  are 
identically  equal  to  the  government’s  deficit,  plus  the  trade  surplus,  plus  investment,  plus 
consumption  out  of  profits,  and  less  saving  out  of  wages.‘(Minsky  1992d)  He  would 
incorporate  this  view  into  his  theory  as  the  proposition  that  “investment  today  is  forthcoming 
only  if  investment 
investment  occurs. 
is  expected  in  the  future”  as  aggregate  profits  will  not  exist  unless 
He,  then,  argued  that  profits  cannot  be  explained  as  a result  of  competition 
(since  in  the  aggregate  they  are  determined  as  in  the  Kalecki-Levy  equation);  this  means  that 
competition  and  innovation  can  only  redistribute  profits  among  firruss  Finally,  if  investment 
falls,  then  profits  will  fall,  which  will  further  discourage  investment  unless  one  of  the  other 
components  of  the  profit  equation  should  rise  in  compensation.  The  likely  candidate,  of 
course,  is  government  deficit  spending.  (Minsky  1980)  In  this  way,  he  came  back  to  his 
earlier  conclusion  that  government  deficits  can  be  stabilizing;  here  he  added  the  notion  that 
deficits  create  profits,  and  as  it  is the  expectation  of  profit  that  drives  the  economy, 
countercyclical  deficits  can  be  stabilizing.  (Minsky  1992d.) 
THE  FINANCIAL  INSTABILITY  HYPOTHESIS 
During  the  1960s  Minsky  developed  the  financial  instability  hypothesis  as  he  tried  to  answer 
the  question,  “can  it 
“financial  instability 
institutional  nature.’ 
happen  again?“.  As  readers  are  no  doubt  familiar  with  Minsky’s 
hypothesis”  (FIH),  we  only  wish  to  summarize  it  while  emphasizing  its 
According  to  Minsky,  a financial  system  naturally  evolves  from  a robust 
12 structure  to  a  fragile  structure,  or  from  a structure  that  is  consistent  with  stability  to  one  that 
is  conducive  to  instability.  Note  that  it is  a bit  misleading  to  use  the  word  “stability”,  for 
Minsky  would  emphasize  that  systems  are  continually  evolving,  generally  toward  fragility,  so 
that  a  “stable”  position  is  ephemeral.  Indeed,  he  continually  argued  that  “stability  is 
destabilizing”:  “The  first  theorem  of  the  financial  instability  hypothesis  is  that  the  economy 
has  financing  regimes  under  which  it  is  stable,  and  financing  regimes  in  which  it  is  unstable. 
The  second  theorem  of  the  financial  instability  hypothesis  is  that  over  periods  of  prolonged 
prosperity,  the  economy  transits  from  financial  relations  that  make  for  a  stable  system  to 
financial  relations  that  make  for  an  unstable  system”.  (Minsky  1992c,  pp.  7-8) 
It  is  important  to  emphasize  that  Minsky’s  FIH  is  institutionally-specific,  applicable 
only  to  a capitalist  economy  with  complex  financing  of  long-lived  capital  assets.  In  the 
absence  of  long-term  finance,  undertaken  on  the  basis  of  longer-term  expectations,  the 
Minskian  transformation  toward  fragility  would  not  occur  (this  does  not  mean  that  a  simpler 
capitalism  could  not  experience  instability).  According  to  Minsky,  financial  positions  evolve 
from  “hedge”  to  “speculative”  and  finally  to  “Ponzi”,  first  as  expectations  about  future  returns 
become  increasingly  optimistic,  and  later  as  expectations  are  disappointed  or  financial 
arrangements  are  disrupted. 
It  can  be  shown  that  if  hedge  financing  dominates,  then  the  economy  may  well  be  an 
equilibrium  seeking  and  containing  system.  In  contrast,  the  greater  the  weight  of 
speculative  and  Ponzi  finance,  the  greater  the  likelihood  that  the  economy  is  a 
deviation  amplifying  system.  .  .  .  [O]ver  a protracted  period  of  good  times,  capitalist 
economies  tend  to  move  from  a financial  structure  dominated  by  hedge  finance  units 
13 to  a  structure  in  which  there  is  large  weight  to  units  engaged  in  speculative  and  Ponzi 
finance.  (Minsky  1992c,  pp.  7-8) 
It  is precisely  the  apparent  “stability”  that  generates  changes  of  expectations  that  leads  to 
adoption  of  financial  positions  that  cannot  be  validated  should  events  prove  to  be  less 
favorable  than  expected--that  is,  the  transformation  from  robust  (hedge)  arrangements  to 
fragile  (speculative)  positions.  These  speculative  positions  then  are  pushed  to  Ponzi  for  a 
variety  of  reasons:  the  terms  on  which  finance  is  available  become  less  favorable  (either 
because  providers  become  concerned  with  their  own  positions  or  because  the  central  bank 
adopts  tighter  policy  to  head-off  perceived  inflationary  pressures),  some  expectations  are 
revised,  income  flows  that  had  been  expected  are  not  forthcoming,  and  so  on.  In  any  case,  the 
FIH  depends  critically  on  the  institutional  arrangements  of  the  modem  capitalist  economy  and 
on  the  evolution  of  behavior  that  is  likely  to  take  place  given  these  arrangements. 
According  to  Minsky,  “A capitalist,  or  if  you  wish  a market,  economy  is  a  financial 
system.”  (Minsky  1992b,  p.  16) In  contrast,  “The  neoclassical  way  of  doing  economics,  which 
rests  upon  splitting  the  financial  system  off  from  what  is  called  the  real  economy,  throws  no 
appreciable  light  on  the  effect  that  a  financial  system  has  upon  the  functioning  of  the 
economy:  the  only  relevant  neoclassical  position  is that  the  financial  structure  makes  no 
difference.”  (Minsky  1992b,  p.  15) It  is precisely  the  absence  of  credible  financial 
arrangements  and  institutional  detail  that  renders  neoclassical  theory  useless  for  analyzing  the 
capitalist  system.  By  explicitly  beginning  with  the  financial  system,  and  by  analyzing  the 
transformation  of  the  system  from  “hedge”  to  “speculative”,  Minsky’s  analysis  is  relevant  to 
14 the  real  world  capitalist  economy.  Analysis  devoid  of  institutions  “throws  no  appreciable 
light”  on  real  world  economies.” 
Second,  from  his  earliest  publications,  Minsky  realized  the  importance  of  explaining 
the  new  form(s)  of  capitalism  with  which  he  was  concerned,  and,  in  particular,  with 
identifying  the  reasons  why  the  forms  of  post-war  capitalism  were  so  different  from  that 
which  existed  before  WWII.  Again,  the  difference  is  institutional.  Pre-war  capitalism  not  only 
exhibited  much  greater  amplitude  in  its  business  cycles,  but  financial  crises  regularly 
coincided  with  depressions.  For  Minsky,  a defining  characteristic  of  the  Great  Depression  was 
the  “Fisher”  debt  deflation  in  conjunction  with  loss  of  real  output.  He  frequently  pointed  out 
that  while  real  output  only  fell  by  half  (and  unemployment  rose  to  “only”  25%),  asset  prices 
fell  by  85%.  Certainly  he  did  not  mean  to  minimize  the  suffering  of  the  unemployed  and 
underemployed,  but  in  his  view,  the  bigger  problem  for  the  capitalist  system  was  the  complete 
absence  of  aggregate  profits  (or,  as  he  preferred,  gross  capital  income).  Further,  during  the 
Great  Depression,  balance  sheets  were  “simplified”  as  most  financial  debts  and  assets  were 
wiped-out.  This  allowed  the  financial  system  to  emerge  from  the  Great  Depression  with 
“simple”,  or  robust,  balance  sheets  with  little  leveraging  and  with  most  assets  taking  the  form 
of  equity  positions.  After  the  war,  relatively  stable,  moderate  growth  occurred  on  the  basis  of 
hedge  finance. 
Economic  activity  in  the  early  postwar  setting  began  with  a cautious  use  of  debt.  But 
as  the  period  over  which  the  economy  did  well  began  to  lengthen,  margins  of  safety  in 
indebtedness  decreased  and  the  system  evolved  toward  a greater  reliance  on  debt 
relative  to  internal  finance,  as  well  as  toward  the  use  of  debt  to  acquire  existing  assets. 
15 As  a result,  the  once  robust  financial  system  became  increasingly  fragile.  (Minsky  and 
Whalen  1996,  p.  4) 
After  1966,  “the  amplitude  of  the  business  cycle  has  increased  and  financial  crises 
have  become  regular  occurrences.  Another  Great  Depression  has  been  prevented,  but  the  same 
actions  that  stabilize  the  economy  also  validate  speculative  financial  practices.”  (Minsky  and 
Whalen  1996,  pp.  4-5)  Thus,  even  as business  cycles  have  not  been  eliminated,  neither 
depressions  nor  widespread  balance  sheet  simplifications  have  occurred.”  Something  of 
fundamental  importance  seems  to  have  occurred  to  prevent  reoccurrence  of  a Fisher-type  debt 
deflation.  Minsky  argued  that  “ceilings  and  floors”  were  put  into  place  during  the  1930s  and 
in  the  immediate  post-war  period  to  successfully--thus  far--prevent  another  debt  deflation.‘* 
These  ceilings  and  floors  take  the  form  of  a wide  variety  of  institutional  arrangements--some 
governmental,  some  private;  some  automatic,  some  discretionary;  some  intentional  and  some 
fortuitous.  He  argued  “institutions  and  interventions  thwart  the  instability  breeding  dynamics 
that  are  natural  to  market  economies  by  interrupting  the  endogenous  process  and  “starting”  the 
economy  again  with  non  market  determined  values  as  “initial  conditions”“.  (Ferri  and  Minsky, 
1991,  p.  4) 
The  two  most  important  “ceilings  and  floors”  are:  the  growth  of  big  government  that  is 
capable  of  running  large  (relative  to  the  size  of  the  economy)  countercyclical  deficits  and 
surpluses  and  central  bank  intervention  as  lender  of  last  resort.  Countercyclical  deficits  and 
surpluses  allow  the  government  to  place  ceilings  and  floors  on  aggregate  demand,  and,  thus, 
profits,  which  helps  to  maintain  business  income  flows  in  bad  times  (through  deficits)  while 
dampening  these  flows  in  booms  (through  fiscal  surpluses).  Similarly,  the  central  bank  places 
16 a  floor  on  asset  prices  through  its  willingness  to  intervene  to  provide  liquidity  that  reduces 
pressure  for  “firesales”  of  assets  that  could  cause  prices  to  plummet.  In  this  way,  when  private 
spending  falls,  a government  deficit  automatically  is  created  that  helps  to  maintain  aggregate 
demand  and  business  gross  capital  income,  allowing  firms  to  continue  to  service  financial 
positions.  Should  some  firms  experience  difficulty,  central  bank  intervention  can  help  to 
prevent  problems  from  spreading.  Of  course,  as  Minsky  continually  emphasized  (and  long 
before  such  came  to  pass)  the  problem  is  that  if  debt  deflations  are  eliminated,  increasingly 
fragile  positions  can  be  taken  with  no  “cleansing”  (or  balance  sheet  simplification)  ever  taking 
place.  This  is  why  other  institutional  arrangements  have  to  be  adopted  to  place  a ceiling  on 
expectations  of  asset  prices.  It  should  be  emphasized  that  Minsky  never  argued  that  these 
constraints  must  come  only  from  government;  indeed,  he  argued  that  capitalists  had  long 
sought  ways  to  protect  asset  values.  In  fact,  capitalism  without  institutional  constraints  is 
impossible  to  imagine  as  the  incentives  to  try  to  protect  asset  values  are  too  great.  The  point 
is,  however,  that  the  constraints  that  are  possible  in  a  small  government  capitalist  economy 
were  proven  to  be  insufficient  to  prevent  “it” (a  debt  deflation)  from  happening. 
This  analysis  led  to  what  he  called  his  “anti-laissez  faire  theorem”,  the  proposition  that 
“in  a world  where  the  internal  dynamics  imply  instability,  a  semblance  of  stability  can  be 
achieved  or  sustained  by  introducing  conventions,  constraints  and  interventions  into  the 
environment.”  (Ferri  and  Minsky  1991,  p.  20)  Thus,  “Apt  intervention  and  institutional 
structures  are  necessary  for  market  economies  to  be  successful.”  (Ferri  and  Minsky  1991,  p. 
24)  “[IInstitutions  can  act  as  the  equivalent  of  circuit  breakers.”  (Delli  Gatti,  Gallegati  and 
Minsky,  1994,  p.  2)  “To  contain  the  evils  that  market  systems  can  inflict,  capitalist  economies 
17 developed  sets  of  institutions  and  authorities,  which  can  be  characterized  as  the  equivalent  of 
circuit  breakers.  These  institutions  in  effect  stop  the  economic  processes  that  breed  the 
incoherence,  and  restart  the  economy  with  new  initial  conditions  and  perhaps  with  new 
reaction  coefficients.”  (Delli  Gatti,  Gallegati  and  Minsky,  1994,  p.  3)  These  institutions  are 
imposed  and  replace  the  endogenously  determined  variables  that  generate  incoherence;  these 
interventions  create  new  initial  conditions  from  which  the  economy  begins  on  a new  path-- 
and  “the  aptness  of  institutions  and  interventions  will  largely  determine  the  extent  to  which 
the  path  of  the  economy  through  time  is tranquil  or  turbulent:  progressive,  stagnant,  or 
deteriorating.”  (Delli  Gatti,  Gallegati  and  Minsky,  1994,  p.  4)  Thus,  apt  intervention  is 
required  for  “successful  capitalism”.  (Ferri  and  Minsky  1991,  p.  24) 
This  then  provides  the  framework  for  Minsky’s  analysis  of  the  modern  capitalist 
economy:  a  special  kind  of  instability  results  because  of  the  primary  features  of  this  sort  of 
economy,  in  particular,  the  financial  arrangements  that  are  necessary  in  a private,  for-profit 
economy  which  requires  expensive,  long-lived  capital  assets.  Instability  can  be  constrained 
through  development  of  appropriate  institutions  that  provide  “ceilings  and  floors”;  however, 
“stability”  cannot  be  achieved  because  of  the  impact  that  “tranquility”  will  have  on 
expectations  and  thus  behavior.  Still,  capitalism  with  ceilings  and  floors  is  preferable  to 
capitalism  without  institutional  constraints,  and  the  constraints  that  are  possible  in  a  small 
government  capitalist  economy  were  insufficient  to  prevent  “it” (a  debt  deflation)  from 
happening.  In  contrast,  the  constraints  that  are  possible  with  a big  government  form  of 
capitalism  have  been  sufficient.  The  problem  is  that  the  absence  of  “it” has  changed  behavior 
in  ways  that  are  likely  to  increase  the  likelihood  that  “it” J&J  happen  again.  The  question  is 
18 what  sorts  of  changes  to  these  institutions  can  continue  to  forestall  “it” while  at  the  same  time 
promoting  the  values  of  a democratic  society.  We  now  turn  to  Minsky’s  policy  analysis. 
STABILIZING  THE  UNSTABLE  ECONOMY 
In  his  1986  book,  Stabilizing  the  Unstable  Economy,  Minsky  argued  “The  policy  problem  is 
to  devise  institutional  structures  and  measures  that  attenuate  the  thrust  to  inflation, 
unemployment,  and  slower  improvements  in  the  standard  of  living  without  increasing  the 
likelihood  of  a deep  depression.”  (Minsky  1986,  p.  295)  His  “agenda  for  reform”  addressed 
four  areas:  “Big  Government  (size,  spending,  and  taxing),  an  employment  strategy,  financial 
reform,  and  market  power”.  (Minsky  1986,  p.  295)  We  will  very  briefly  summarize  the 
reforms  advocated. 
a)  Big  Government. 
According  to  Minsky,  government  must  be  large  enough  that  the  swings  of  its  budget  are 
sufficient  to  offset  swings  of  private  investment;  this  dictates  that  government  spending 
should  be  approximately  “the  same  order  of  magnitude  as  or  larger  than  investment.”  (Minsky 
1986,  p.  297)  This  means  that  at  full  employment,  the  budget  should  be  balanced  at  about 
20%  of  GDP;  below  full  employment,  spending  would  be  somewhat  more  than  this  while  tax 
revenues  would  be  somewhat  less;  above  full  employment,  revenues  would  exceed  20%  of 
GDP  while  spending  would  be  less.  Minsky  was  quite  concerned  with  maintaining  the 
appearance  of  credit-worthiness,  which  necessitates  “a tax  and  spending  regime  in  place  that 
would  yield  a favorable  cash  flow  (a  surplus)  under  reasonable  and  attainable  circumstances”. 
19 (Minsky  1986,  p.  302)  For  this  reason,  he  argued  that  the  fiscal  stance  of  the  Reagan 
administration  was  out  of  line;  while  tax  revenues  were  approximately  the  right  size,  spending 
was  several  percentage  points  of  GDP  too  high--even  at  full  employment  a deficit  would 
result.  Spending  cuts  would  be  required. 
Most  importantly,  Minsky  wanted  to  reorder  spending  priorities  toward  employment 
programs,  child  allowances,  and  public  infrastructure  investment,  and  away  from  defence  and 
non-Old  Age,  Survivors,  Disability,  and  Hospital  Insurance  (OASDHI)  transfers.  (Minsky 
1986,  p.  308)  He  believed  that  an  employment  program  could  substitute  for  most  transfers 
other  than  those  aimed  at  the  aged,  which  would  allow  substantial  cuts  in  non-defence 
spending.  Finally,  he  wanted  to  dispense  with  automatic  cost-of-living  adjustments  so  that 
inflation  would  move  the  government’s  budget  toward  balance  (by  increasing  tax  revenues 
through  “bracket  creep”  while  avoiding  increases  of  social  spending).  In  some  respects, 
Minsky’s  arguments  appear  to  be  very  close  to  those  recently  discussed  and  in  some  cases 
implemented--i.e.,  President  Clinton’s  proposal  to  “end  welfare  as  we  know  it”.  However,  as 
we  will  discuss  below,  Minsky’s  employment  program  would  provide  a greater  “safety  net” 
than  do  the  new  welfare  “reforms”. 
Part  of  the  reason  that  Minsky  wanted  to  reduce  transfers  is  because  he  was  convinced 
that  these  impart  an  inflationary  bias  to  the  economy.  (Minsky  1986,  p.  3 13)  In  his  view,  the 
level  of  aggregate  demand  determines  the  mark-up  at the  aggregate  level  over  aggregate  costs 
of  production  (primarily,  wages).  As  social  spending  generates  income  and  adds  to  aggregate 
demand  without  contributing  much  to  aggregate  supply,  the  mark-up  over  costs  is  higher.  If 
government  spending  could  be  shifted  away  from  policies  to  raise  aggregate  demand  without 
20 increasing  production  to  those  that  would  increase  both  aggregate  demand  as  well  as  increase 
aggregate  supply,  then  prices  would  be  lower.  In  particular,  public  infrastructure  development 
as  well  as  “workfare”  rather  than  “welfare”  would  be  expected  to  reduce  inflation. 
With  regard  to  taxes,  Minsky  believed  that  most  taxes  are  inflationary  because  they 
add  to  costs;  in  particular,  the  portion  of  the  Social  Security  tax  paid  by  employers  as  well  as 
the  corporate  income  tax  were  believed  to  be  a cost  passed  along  in  price.  (Minsky  1986,  p. 
305)  In  addition,  Minsky  feared  that  the  payroll  tax  encouraged  substitution  of  capital  for 
labor.  He  thus  advocated  elimination  of  the  corporate  income  tax  as  well  as  the  employer 
portion  of  the  payroll  tax.  He  supported,  as  will  be  discussed  in  greater  detail  below,  a broad- 
based  value-added  tax  as  an  alternative.  He  also  supported  greater  use  of  excise  taxes  to 
influence  behavior;  in  particular,  he  advocated  a much  larger  tax  on  petroleum. 
b)  Employment. 
A  key  component  of  Minsky’s  reform  strategy  was  to  remove  barriers  to  labor  force 
participation  and  to  ensure  that  all  who  wanted  a job  would  be  able  to  obtain  one.  (Minsky 
1986,  p.  308)  He  argued  that  various  transfer  payment  programs,  in  particular  AFDC  and 
Social  Security  program  constraints  on  wage  income  allowed  to  the  elderly  collecting 
benefits,  provide  significant  barriers  to  work.  His  reforms  would  include  substitution  of  a 
universal  children’s  allowance  for  AFDC,  as  well  as  elimination  of  wage  income  constraints 
but  with  an  extension  of  retirement  age  for  Social  Security  benefits.  More  importantly,  he 
advocated  a true  “full  employment”  policy:  the  government  would  act  as  the  employer  of  last 
resort,  using  a program  modeled  on  the  New  Deal’s  Civilian  Conservation  Corps  or  Works 
21 Progress  Administration  (WPA).  This  would  guarantee  a public  sector  job  to  anyone  unable  to 
find  a private  sector  job,  at  some  established  minimum  wage. 
The  policy  problem  is  to  develop  a  strategy  for  full  employment  that  does  not  lead  to 
instability,  inflation,  and  unemployment.  The  main  instrument  of  such  a policy  is  the 
creation  of  an  infinitely  elastic  demand  for  labor  at  a  floor  or  minimum  wage  that  does 
not  depend  upon  long-  and  short-run  profit  expectations  of  business.  Since  only 
government  can  divorce  the  offering  of  employment  from  the  profitability  of  hiring 
workers,  the  infinitely  elastic  demand  for  labor  must  be  created  by  government. 
(Minsky  1986,  p.  308) 
He  argued  that  this  program  would  allow  full  employment  without  generating  inflationary 
pressures,  or,  at  least,  would  be  no  more  inflationary  than  the  current  system.  (Recall  that  he 
argued  that  transfer  payments  are  inflationary  because  they  generate  aggregate  demand 
without  necessarily  generating  aggregate  supply.)  Since  WPA-style  jobs  would  pay  less  than 
those  in  the  private  sector  and  because  they  would  generate  at  least  some  increase  of  potential 
output,  they  would  not  place  significant  pressure  on  either  private  sector  wages  or  prices. 
Minsky  argued  that  the  current  system  actually  sets  a minimum  wage  at  $0  because  if 
one  is  unemployed,  the  wage  is  zero;  in  his  scheme,  a true  minimum  wage--one  set  by  policy- 
-would  be  in  effect  since  all  could  work  at  the  WPA-wage.  (Minsky  1986,  p.  3 10)  While  in 
the  current  system,  employment  is  subject  to  cyclical  fluctuation,  in  Minsky’s  system, 
fluctuation  of  private  sector  employment  would  be  offset  by  variations  in  the  proportion  of 
workers  in  government-sponsored  WPA  jobs.  Also  in  the  current  system,  employers  have  to 
compete  with  government-provided  income  given  for  not  working;  wages  must  be  set  at  a 
22 high  enough  level  to  induce  those  receiving  transfers  to  accept  employment;  in  Minsky’s 
system,  the  alternative  to  private  employment  (and  to  public,  non-WPA  employment)  is  WPA 
employment.  As  long  as  the  WPA  wage  is  not  adjusted  upwardly  very  often,  it  could  even  act 
to  dampen  wage  pressures  and  thus  lead  to  less  inflation  potential  than  the  current  system. 
c)  Financial  Reform. 
As  discussed  above,  Minsky  believed  that  Fed  willingness  to  intervene  as  lender  of  last  resort 
generates  changes  of  behavior  in  financial  markets;  for  this  reason,  the  Fed  must  take  greater 
responsibility  for  regulating  financial  markets  to  “guide  the  evolution  of  financial  institutions 
by  favoring  stability  enhancing  and  discourage  instability-augmenting  institutions  and 
practices.”  (Minsky  1986,  p.  3 14) Foremost  among  his  recommendations  was  greater  reliance 
on  prudential  supervision  of  banks.  He  favored  greater  use  of  the  discount  window  (and 
correspondingly  less  use  of  open  market  purchases)  as  the  method  through  which  reserves 
would  be  provided;  this  would  allow  the  Fed  to  reward  prudent  bank  practices  with  more 
favorable  terms  at  the  window.  Further,  he  favored  policies  that  would  tie  lending  to  specific 
assets--something  like  a  “real  bills  doctrine”--so  that  “the  payment  commitments  on  the  debts 
used  can  be  closely  related  to  the  cash  flows  that  these  assets  are  expected  to  yield.  The 
financial  flow  relations  are  analogous  to  those  that  characterize  hedge  financing.”  (Minsky 
1986,  p.  3 15)  Of  course,  this  would  not  always  be  possible,  but  it  can  be  encouraged  by 
opening  the  discount  window  to  a wide  variety  of  types  of  financial  institutions  (he  included 
sales  finance  companies,  life  insurance  companies  and  even  ordinary  corporations)  so  long  as 
they  engage  in  “to-the-asset  financing”.  (Minsky  1986,  p.  322) 
23 While  the  corporate  form  is necessary  in  an  economy  with  extremely  expensive  capital 
assets,  this  sort  of  institutional  arrangement  “facilitates  the  divorce  of  financing  from  the 
ownership  and  acquisition  of  particular  assets...  . Consequently,  the  corporation,  initially  a 
device  for  extending  hedge  financing  to  long-lasting  capital  assets,  can  be  a vehicle  for 
speculative  finance--and  because  it  facilitates  both  capital  intensive  modes  of  production  and 
speculative  financing,  a destabilizing  influence.”  (Minsky  1986,  p.  3 16)  He  believed  that 
policies  could  reduce  “instability-enhancing  power  of  corporations”;  among  these,  he  included 
elimination  of  the  corporate  income  tax,  which  leads  to  a bias  in  favor  of  debt-financing  over 
equity  financing,  policies  that  would  favor  employment  of  labor  over  investment  in  physical 
capital  (such  as  elimination  of  the  payroll  tax  on  employers),  and  reduction  of  policies  that 
favor  “bigness’‘--as  discussed  in  the  next  section. 
d)  Market  Power. 
Countercyclical  government  deficits  maintain  profit  flows,  allowing  firms  to  validate  debt 
commitments  even  when  private  investment  spending  falls.  Minsky  saw  no  alternative  to  such 
behavior  on  an  aggregate  level.  (Minsky  1986,  p.  332)  However,  it  is  essential  that  individual 
firms  and  banks  are  allowed  to  fail,  for  otherwise  there  is no  market  discipline.  In  Minsky’s 
view,  the  primary  incentive  to  obtaining  market  power  is  the  ability  to  set  prices  at  a 
sufficient  level  to  service  debt.  In  a small  government  form  of  capitalism,  collusion  and 
government  policy  may  be  warranted  to  try  to  maintain  prices  in  conditions  of  low  demand. 
However  in  big  government  capitalism,  where  government  deficits  maintain  profits,  “there  is 
no  need  for  policy  to  foster  market  power  that  protects  profits”.  (Minsky  1986,  p.  318)  Indeed 
Minsky  feared  that  conditions  favoring  large  monopolies  could  be  detrimental  because  they 
24 would  lead  to  firms  that  are  “too  big  to  fail”.  Thus,  he  favored  policies  that  would  reduce  the 
incentives  to  “bigness”;  in  particular,  he  believed  that  policies  that  favored  medium-sized 
banks  would  also  favor  medium  sized  firms,  as  bank  size  determines,  to  a large  extent,  the 
size  of  customers--big  banks  serve  big  customers,  while  medium  sized  banks  serve  medium 
size  customers.  “A  decentralized  banking  system  with  many  small  and  independent  banks  is 
conducive  to  an  industrial  structure  made  up  of  mainly  small  and  medium-size  firms.” 
(Minsky  1986,  p.  3 19) Policies  that  would  promote  such  a  system  include  elimination  of 
much  of  the  segmentation  of  activities  (i.e.,  commercial  banking  and  investment  banking)--at 
least  for  small-to-medium  size  banks  so  they  could  provide  a wide  range  of  services  to  their 
small-to-medium  size  customers,  uniform,  higher,  capital-to-asset  ratios  (this  would  favor 
smaller  banks  as  these  typically  have  higher  ratios),  and  freer  entry. 
Minsky  also  argued  that  “industrial  policy”  could  not  only  favor  smaller  firms,  but 
could  also  favor  employment  over  capital-intensive  production  techniques.  Smaller  t%-rns tend 
to  use  more  labor-intensive  techniques  merely  because  their  ability  to  finance  positions  in 
long-lived  and  expensive  capital  assets  is  lower.  He  also  favored  regulation  and  government 
intervention  into  specific  markets  wherever  these  would  promote  competition.  While  he 
agreed  with  orthodoxy  that  “competitive  markets  are  devices  to  promote  efficiency”,  he  went 
on  to  note  that  “The  market  is  an  adequate  regulator  of  products  and  processes  except  when 
market  power  or  externalities  exist;  once  they  exist--whether  caused  by  the  government  or  by 
market  processes--regulation  can  be  necessary  to  constrain  the  exercise  of  power.”  (Minsky 
1986,  p.  329)  Thus,  “An  industrial  policy  that  takes  the  form  of  promoting  competitive 
industry,  facilitating  financing  and  aiding  and  abetting  the  development  of  a  labor  force  that  is trained  and  productive,  is  highly  desirable.”  (Minsky  1986,  p.  329)  Note,  by  the  way,  that  he 
credited  his  teacher,  Henry  Simons,  for  this  insight.  He  also  saw  industrial  policy  as  a viable 
alternative  to  anti-trust  prosecution,  which  he  believed  to  be  a  failure  precisely  because  it 
cannot  create  the  conditions  required  to  permit  smaller  firms  to  prosper. 
Finally,  Minsky  admitted  that  these  policies  would  have  negative  impacts  on  many 
mega-corps  which  would  find  that  in  the  new  environment,  they  would  be  unable  to  service 
debt.  He  abhorred  the  way  in  which  the  government  had  “bailed-out”  Lockheed,  Chrysler,  and 
some  electric  utilities;  he  would  later  criticize  the  Saving  and  Loan  bail-out.  Instead,  he 
favored  “socialization  of  industries  that  require  financial  restructuring”  through  a  “government 
refinancing  corporation”;  later,  he  would  specifically  advocate  creation  of  such  an 
organization  to  handle  the  S&L  fiasco,  modeled  on  the  Reconstruction  Finance  Corporation 
(RFC)  of  the  1930s. 
MINSKY’S  WORK  AT  THE  JEROME  LEVY  ECONOMICS  INSTITUTE 
After  taking  his  post  at  the  Jerome  Levy  Economics  Institute,  Minsky  continued  and  indeed 
intensified  his  attempts  to  formulate  policy  relevant  for  the  institutions  of  modern  capitalism. 
In  particular,  he  emphasized  that  a)  capitalism  is  dynamic;  b)  the  1930s  reforms  are  no  longer 
appropriate  to  the  existing  form  of  capitalism  (dubbed  “money  manager  capitalism”);  c)  the 
currently  dominant  conventional  wisdom  that  “free  markets”  promote  stability  is  flawed  and 
dangerous;  and  d)  new  policies  are  required  to  reduce  insecurity,  promote  stability,  and 
encourage  democracy.  These  concerns  led  to  proposals  regarding  bank  regulation,  community 
26 development  banking,  tax  reform,  unemployment  and  poverty,  and  introduction  of 
“institutions”  rather  than  “markets”  to  the  formerly  socialist  states.  We  first  examine  his  view 
that  capitalism  is  dynamic,  then  we  turn  to  policy  reform  appropriate  for  the  new  form  of 
capitalism,  and  finally  to  specific  policies  he  advocated. 
a)  57  Varieties  of  Capitalism. 
According  to  Minsky,  capitalism  comes  in  many  forms:  “The  Heinz  Company...used  to  have  a 
slogan  “57 varieties”  [and]  I used  to  say  that  there  are  as  many  varieties  of  capitalism  as 
Heinz  has  pickles...”  (Minsky  199 lb,  p.  10) To  a great  extent,  these  different  forms  of 
capitalism  result  from  different  financial  arrangements.  “Capitalism  is  a dynamic,  evolving 
system  that  comes  in  many  forms.  Nowhere  is this  dynamism  more  evident  than  in  its 
financial  structure....”  (Minsky  and  Whalen  1996,  pp.  2-3)  “There  have  been  many  different 
financial  structures  throughout  history.  These  financial  systems  differ  in  how  they  affect 
economic  efficiency  and  stability  as  well  as  the  distribution  of  power  in  the  economy.” 
(Minsky  1991b,  p.  5) 
After  WWII,  capitalism  in  the  US  took  the  form  that  Minsky  labeled  “paternalistic 
capitalism”  which  could  be  characterized  as  a relatively  high-consumption,  big  government, 
and  big  union  form  of  capitalism  that  largely  resulted  from  post-war  reforms,  institutions,  and 
interventions  that  constrained  instability  in  the  financial  system.  These  included: 
“countercyclical  fiscal  policy”,  “low  interest  rates  and  interventions  by  the  Federal  Reserve”, 
“deposit  insurance”,  “establishment  of  a temporary,  national  investment  bank  (the 
Reconstruction  Finance  Corporation)  to  infuse  government  equity  into  transportation,  industry 
27 and  finance”,  “and  interventions  by  specialized  organizations”.  (Minsky  and  Whalen  1996,  p. 
3) 
The  relatively  stable  growth  and  absence  of  debt  deflations  allowed  the  development 
of  huge  portfolios  of  financial  instruments--representing  accumulated  pensions,  distributed 
profits,  personal  financial  wealth,  and  retained  earnings.  In  addition,  as  discussed  above, 
speculative  finance  increasingly  replaced  hedge  finance--creating  a demand  for  the 
accumulated  financial  wealth.  As  a result,  a new  form  of  capitalism  emerged. 
“Capitalism  in  the  United  States  is now  in  a new  stage,  money  manager  capitalism,  in  which 
the  proximate  owners  of  a vast  proportion  of  financial  instruments  are  mutual  and  pension 
funds.”  (Minsky  1996b,  p.  3)  The  values  of  portfolios  are  daily  “marked  to  market”,  forcing  a 
“short  view”  on  managers,  who  have  “become  increasingly  sensitive  to  the  stock  market 
valuation  of  their  firm”,  and  thereby  greatly  increasing  uncertainty.  (Minsky  and  Whalen 
1996b,  p.  5) 
When  one  considers  the  pressures  due  to  both  the  rapidly  evolving  financial  system 
and  the  economy’s  other  structural  changes,  it  is  no  surprise  that  economic  insecurity 
is  widespread.  With  the  passing  of  the  paternalistic  financial  structure,  corporate 
paternalism  has  also  faded.  Workers  at  nearly  all  levels  are  insecure,  as  entire 
divisions  are  bought  and  sold  and  as  corporate  boards  exhibit  a chronic  need  to 
downsize  overhead  and  to  seek  out  the  least  expensive  set  of  variable  inputs.  (Minsky 
and  Whalen  1996,  pp.  5-6) 
28 This  new  form  of  capitalism  not  only  tends  toward  financial  instability--as  evidenced 
by  increasingly  frequent  and  severe  financial  crises--but  has  also  eliminated  the  expectation 
and  even  the  hope  of  rising  living  standards  for  most  Americans. 
b)  Policy  Must  Be  Reformulated. 
“Sixty  years  ago  capitalism  was  a  failed  economic  order....  The  capitalism  that  failed  over 
1929-33  was  a  small  government,  constrained  central  bank  essentially  laissez-faire  economy. 
The  capitalism  that  had  a good  run  after  the  second  world  war  was  a big  government 
interventionist  economy  with  central  banks  that  were  less  constrained  than  during  the  inter 
war  years.”  (Minsky  1993,  pp.  2,  19)  “While  the  capitalisms  of  the  United  States  and  Western 
Europe  were  truly  successful  societies  during  the  first  two  and  a half  decades  after  the  second 
world  war,  their  performance  over  the  last  decade  and  a half  falls  short...  The  successful 
capitalisms  of  the  1950s  through  the  1970s  were  not  the  same  as  the  capitalisms  that  failed  in 
the  1930s.”  (Minsky  1993,  pp.  2-3)  “If capitalisms  are  to  be  successful  in  the  2 1st century 
they  are  likely  to  be  quite  different  from  the  models  we  are  familiar  with.”  (Minsky  1993,  p. 
7) 
Thus,  “Economies  evolve,  and  so  too  must  economic  policy.”  (Minsky  and  Whalen 
1996,  p.  8) Existing  policies  are  no  longer  adequate  to  deal  with  the  new  form  of  capitalism-- 
a conclusion  reached  even  by  orthodox  economists.  However,  because  orthodoxy  ignores 
institutional  detail,  its  policy  recommendations  are  dangerous.  In  his  view  much  of  the  current 
debate  over  policy  is  driven  by  a misunderstanding  of  the  way  in  which  an  economy  with 
modern  capitalist  institutions  functions.  That  is,  most  proposals  are  based  on  the  belief  that  a 
“market”  economy  is basically  stable,  that  “markets  always  lead  to  the  promotion  of  the 
29 public  welfare”,  and  that  “financial  crises  and  deep  depressions  arise  from  one  of  the 
following:  non-essential  institutional  flaws  which  prevent  the  market  from  working  its 
wonders,  the  system  of  intervention  contains  openings  which  allow  some  dirty  rotten 
scoundrels  to  operate,  or  external  shocks  dislodge  the  economy.  (Minsky  1991a,  p.  5)  In 
contrast,  “The  Keynesian  view  leads  to  the  proposition  that  the  natural  laws  of  development 
of  capitalist  economies  leads  to  the  emergence  of  conditions  conducive  to  financial 
instability.”  (Minsky  1991a,  p.  5-6) 
Minsky  argued  “Over  the  past  dozen  or  so  years  the  1933-1937  model  has  shown  its 
age.  Although  it has  not  broken  down  as  completely  as  the  older  laissez-faire  model  had  over 
the  1929-33  period,  quite  clearly  our  current  model  of  capitalism  needs  to  be  at  least 
thoroughly  overhauled  if  not  replaced.  Whether  he  realizes  it  or  not,  the  historic  task  of 
President  Clinton  is to  discover  and  put  in  place  a new  model  capitalism.”  (Minsky  1993,  p. 
1) 
A  number  of  problems  with  the  new  form  of  capitalism  have  been  exposed.  First,  the 
regulatory  agencies  have  lost  power--partly  due  to  the  deregulation  movement,  but  also  due  to 
private  innovations  that  circumvent  existing  power.  Second,  the  Social  Security  system  was 
never  adjusted  for  the  enormous  increase  in  life  expectancy  over  the  post-war  period.  Third, 
the  existing  welfare  system  locks  poor  families  into  a pattern  of  dependency.  Fourth, 
employment  security  has  eroded  as  the  US  abandoned  its  commitment  to  nearly  full 
employment.  (Minsky  1993) 
While  the  reforms  of  the  1930s  served  the  economy  well  for  decades,  institutional 
change  and  the  evolution  to  a  fragile  system  have  made  many  of  these  outdated;  what  is 
30 needed  “is to  put  a  financial  structure  in  place  which  is  conducive  to  doing  the  capital 
development  well.”  (Minsky  199la,  p.  27)  Minsky  argued  “Because  some  institutions,  such  as 
deposit  insurance,  the  savings  and  loan  industry,  and  a number  of  the  great  private  banks,  that 
served  the  economy  well  during  the  first  two  generations  after  the  great  depression,  seem  to 
have  broken  down,  the  need  to  reform  and  to  reconstitute  the  financial  structure  is  now  on  the 
legislative  agenda.”  (Minsky  1991 a, p.  3)  Quick  “policy  fixes”,  however,  such  as  a  shift  from 
government-insured  bank  deposits  to  private  insurance  will  not  do;  these  assume  that  market 
forces  are  inherently  stabilizing,  thus,  all  that  is  needed  is  to  increase  reliance  on  them. 
Rather,  thorough-going  reform  is required,  and  no  reform  can  be  adopted  and  then  left  in 
place  without  continual  revision  to  adapt  to  changing  conditions. 
c)  Promotion  of  Stability,  Security,  and  Democracy. 
Thus,  while  “The  New  Deal  restructuring  of  capitalism  created  institutions  which 
contained  uncertainty...[t]he  evolution  of  the  economy  has  decreased  the  effectiveness  of  the 
New  Deal  reforms  and  money  manager  capitalism  has  radically  increased  uncertainty.  The 
creation  of  new  economic  institutions  which  constrain  the  impact  of  uncertainty  is  necessary.” 
(Minsky  1996b,  p.  4)  “The  aim  of  policy  is  to  assure  that  the  economic  prerequisites  for 
sustaining  the  civil  and  civilized  standards  of  an  open  liberal  society  exists.  If  amplified, 
uncertainty  and  extremes  in  income  maldistribution  and  social  inequalities  attenuate  the 
economic  underpinnings  of  democracy,  then  the  market  behavior  that  creates  these  conditions 
have  to  be  constrained.”  (Minsky  1996b,  p.  15) He  advocated  a number  of  policies  that  he 
believed  could  reduce  uncertainty  while  enhancing  stability  and  democracy  in  the  “money 
manager”  form  of  capitalism.  These  included:  support  for  stronger  trade  unions;  tax  incentives 
31 to  lead  firms  to  offer  family  friendly  benefits  and  work  arrangements;  universal  provision  of 
high  level  health  care  and  education  services;  full  employment,  which  requires  a  larger  and 
more  innovative  government  sector;  an  enhanced  minimum  wage;  an  expanded  Earned 
Income  Tax  Credit;  portable  pensions;  institutional  innovations  to  constrain  money  managers; 
a value  added  tax  as  a  “backdoor”  tariff  and  export  subsidy;  and  a network  of  community 
development  banks.  (Minsky  1996b;  Minsky  and  Whalen  1996) 
Minsky  rejected  the  orthodox  belief  that  government  intervention  designed  to  reduce 
insecurity  must  necessarily  reduce  “efficiency”  by  providing  improper  incentives.  Indeed,  he 
argued  that  policies  to  reduce  insecurity  can  actually  increase  efficiency--by  creating  the 
confidence  necessary  to  engage  in  long-range  planning.  Similarly,  he  argued  that  workers  can 
choose  costly  and  long-term  “investments”  in  self-improvement  if  there  is  a sufficient  degree 
of  secure  employment  at  the  end  of  the  road.  He  believed  that  public-private  partnerships  are 
needed  to  promote  science  and  technological  advancement.  Public  infrastructure  investment, 
aided  by  capital  budgeting,  is  required  not  only  to  increase  public  and  private  “efficiency”  but 
also  to  increase  the  supply  of  public  goods. 
Minsky  also  proposed  a number  of  reforms  in  the  financial  arena.  These  included 
additional  Federal  Reserve  policies  to  encourage  that  credit  be  directed  toward  socially 
desirable  activities;  and  a more  secure  and  prosperous  international  finance  system,  including 
stable  exchange  rates  and  an  international  lender  of  last  resort.  (Minsky  and  Whalen  1996,  p. 
16) Minsky  was  always  concerned  with  creating  an  environment  to  support  financial 
institutions  that  would  encourage  the  “capital  development  of  the  economy”  in  appropriate 
ways,  including  greater  “socialization  of  investment”  through  such  policies  as  using 
32 “dedicated  taxes”  for  infrastructure  development,  capital  budgeting,  development  banks, 
government  holding  companies,  and  greater  reliance  on  government-operated  fee-for-service 
infrastructure.  (Minsky  1992b,  pp.  24-5)  He  also  argued  “Community  banks  are  at  the  heart  of 
a financial  structure  that  will  be  biased  towards  resource  creation.”  (Minsky  1992b,  p.  26) 
These  would  accept  deposits  and  focus  on  mortgage  loans  and  loans  to  local  businesses, 
thereby  encouraging  local  development.  (Minsky  1992b,  p.  27-8) 
Minsky  also  endorsed  a version  of  “narrow  banking”  that  would  separate  “the 
payments  mechanism”  from  “capital  development”.‘3  ”  We  are  now  in  a position  to  realize 
the  dual  set-up  of  100%  money:  financing  the  capital  development  of  the  economy  by 
contingent-valued  liabilities  such  as  mutual  funds,  and  a payments  mechanism  that  is  based 
upon  a portfolio  of  government  bonds  that  is  held  by  the  authority  responsible  for  the 
payment  system.”  (Minsky  1994,  p.  21)  Deposit  insurance  would  not  be  extended  to  the 
“contingent-valued  liabilities”  and  would  not  be  necessary  for  the  “payments  mechanism” 
backed  by  government  bonds.  This  would  reduce  or  eliminate  the  concern  that  federal  deposit 
insurance  encourages  risk-taking  by  commercial  banks.  These  would  be  free  to  finance 
commercial  enterprise,  but  could  not  do  so  on  the  basis  of  government-insured  liabilities.  A 
“safe  and  secure  means  of  payments”  would  be  provided  while  at  the  same  time  much  of  the 
functional  segmentation  of  banking  could  be  eliminated.  Commercial  banks  would  be 
permitted  to  engage  in  a wider  range  of  activity,  including  activities  that  had  been  restricted 
to  investment  banking  (although  these  restrictions  are  rapidly  being  removed).  Banks  would 
use  the  “mutual  funds  financing  technique”  to  finance  a variety  of  activities,  with  “fire-walls” 
in  place  so  that  each  “mutual  fund”  issued  by  a bank  would  be  linked  to  a particular  activity 
33 that  was  financed.  In  this  way,  the  returns  to  each  “mutual  fund”  would  be  related  to  a 
“tranche”  in  the  portfolio,  varying  by  the  degree  of  risk.  (Minsky  1994,  pp.  18-21) 
Minsky  helped  to  develop  the  Levy  Institute’s  proposal  to  establish  a nation-wide 
system  of  community  development  banks  (CDBs).  This  was  also  linked  to  Minsky’s  belief 
that  public  policy  should  encourage  creation  of  small-to-medium  size  firms.  The  CDBs  would 
finance  the  small,  local  “deals”:  “Because  it  is  in  the  public  interest  to  foster  the  creation  of 
new  entrants  into  industry,  trade,  and  finance,  it  is  also  in  the  public  interest  to  have  a  set  of 
strong,  independent,  profit-seeking  banking  institutions  that  specialize  in  financing  smaller 
businesses.”  (Minsky,  et  al,  1993,  p.  9)  Further,  as  discussed,  Minsky  frequently  advocated 
public  equity  investment;  the  CDBs  would  be  established  with  government  capital  infusions 
that  would  be  gradually  retired  as  they  became  profitable  and  accumulated  private  equity. 
Again,  this  followed  the  RFC  model.  The  CDBs  would  combine  commercial  banking,  narrow 
banking,  investment  banking,  and  trust  banking  in  a  small,  community-based  bank  that  could 
offer  a wide  range  of  services  to  the  community. 
Minsky  also  turned  his  analysis  of  the  sorts  of  financial  institutions  and  arrangements 
that  would  be  consistent  with  money  manager  capitalism  toward  an  examination  of 
alternatives  facing  the  formerly  socialist  states.  In  his  analysis  of  “transitional  economies”-- 
formerly  socialist  economies  supposedly  on  the  way  to  becoming  “market  economies”-- 
Minsky  (1991b,  p.  1) argued  “The  purported  intent  of  achieving  a market  economy  is  not  a 
clear  directive.  Because  there  are  many  varieties  of  market  economies,  the  concept  is  not 
precise.”  Further,  “It almost  seems  self-evident  that  the  so-called  planned  economies  were  not 
in  any  sense  planned”  as  they  never  considered  “interdependent  relations  in  production  and 
34 consumption”  as  well  as  the  “conditions  of  the  labor  force”  and  “environmental  impact”  of 
decisions  (Minsky  199lb,  p.  1). Minsky  thus  rejected  both  aspects  of  the  conventional 
approach  as  he  denied  that  these  states  were  moving  away  from  a  “planned”  form  and  also 
denied  they  were  moving  toward  a  “free  market”  form. 
Given  the  absence  of  private  wealth  and  financial  markets  in  these  economies,  both  of 
which  are  essential  to  functioning  of  modem  capitalism,  “Questions  of  how  to  create 
legitimate  titles  need  to  be  addressed  in  discussions  of  the  transformation....”  “The  lesson 
from  history  is  that  the  privatization  of  the  public  domain  should  be  done  very  carefully....” 
(Minsky  199lb,  p.  3)  In  the  absence  of  private  wealth  and  the  absence  of  a history  of  profits 
for  the  publicly  held  capital  assets,  privatization  would  be  particularly  difficult--even  if  the 
assets  could  be  sold,  there  would  be  no  basis  on  which  to  value  them.  Thus,  Minsky 
advocated  creation  of  “public  holding  companies”  which  would  serve  as  a temporary  holder 
of  assets  until  “markets  become  thick  enough  to  absorb  them”.  Initially  the  government  would 
hold  the  shares  and  the  holding  company  would  direct  the  subsidiaries  to  operate  “for  profit”; 
as  private  wealth  is  accumulated  (in  savings,  pension  funds,  mutual  funds)  and  as  a record  of 
profitability  is  generated,  government  ownership  is replaced  by  private  ownership.  “The  public 
holding  company  is  to  be  considered  as  a transitional  device.  The  model  is  the  previously 
mentioned  Reconstruction  Finance  Corporation...”  (Minsky  1991 b, p.  20)  In  Minsky’s  scheme, 
“The  pace  of  privatization  is  ruled  by  the  rate  at  which  enterprises  begin  to  generate 
believable  profit  flows  and  the  rate  at  which  the  market  for  equity  assets  grows...”  (Minsky 
199lb,  p.  2 1) The  transition  would  be  long,  and  can  be  contrasted  with  the  market  shock 
approach  that  was  actually  adopted  in  many  countries  without  regard  for  the  institutions  that 
35 actually  existed.  Minsky’s  approach  would  have  taken  into  account  existing  institutions,  or 
lack  thereof,  and  would  thereby  have  avoided  much  of  the  pain  caused  by  the  market  shock 
approach,  which  ignored  the  institutions  that  actually  existed.  Further,  Minsky’s  proposal 
would  have  encouraged  decentralization  of  power  and  widespread  ownership.  This  stands  in 
stark  contrast  to  orthodox  approaches,  which  force  premature  sales,  before  prices  can  be 
established  for  capital  assets,  and  before  private  wealth  is generated--ensuring  that  only  a  few 
large  “players”  receive  “firesale”  prices  and  will  come  to  dominate  the  economy. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Minsky  always  insisted  that  theory  must  be  institution-specific.  Because  there  are  a variety  of 
possible  types  of  economies,  and  even  “fifty  seven”  varieties  of  capitalism,  theory  must  be 
appropriate  to  the  specific  economy  under  analysis.  His  analysis  concerned  an  evolving, 
developed,  big-government  capitalist  economy  with  complex  and  long-lived  financial 
arrangements.  His  policy  recommendations  were  designed  to  promote  a  successful,  democratic 
form  of  capitalism  given  these  financial  arrangements.  These  policies  would  have  to 
“constrain”  instability  through  creation  of  institutional  “ceilings  and  floors”  while  at  the  same 
time  they  would  have  to  address  the  behavioral  changes  induced  by  reduction  of  instability. 
The  policies  would  also  have  to  promote  rising  living  standards,  expansion  of  democratic 
principles,  and  enhancement  of  security  for  the  average  household.  Thus,  his  proposals  go  far 
beyond  “invisible  handwaves”  of  free  market  idealogues,  but  also  well  beyond 
macroeconomic  tinkering  normally  associated  with  “Keynesians”  to  take  into  consideration  the 
required  institutional  change  that  would  promote  the  sort  of  society  he  desired.  In  this  sense, 
36 we  think  it  is  accurate  to  claim  that  Minsky  successfully  integrated  “Post”  (or,  better, 
“financial”)  Keynesian  theory  with  an  institutionalist  appreciation  for  the  varieties  of  past, 
current,  and  feasible  future  economic  arrangements. 
37 NOTES 
1. Minsky  seems  to  have  produced  relatively  more  students  during  his  few  years  at  Berkeley 
than  he  produced  during  his  long  tenure  at  Washington  University.  Perhaps  this  was 
somewhat  intentional,  for  he  later  said  that  part  of  the  reason  he  moved  to  St.  Louis  was  to 
obtain  more  time  for  his  research  in  a relaxed  atmosphere.  One  of  the  authors  (Wray)  notes 
that  Minsky  was  very  tough  (at  least  on  first  year  graduate  students;  he  was  notoriously  soft- 
hearted  when  it  came  to  undergraduates)  at  Washington  University.  Students  could  expect  that 
their  papers  would  be  returned  “on  the  wing”  as  Minsky  tossed  the  paper  at  the  student  while 
proclaiming  that  the  paper  was  hopelessly  confused  and  unacceptable.  Many  graduate  students 
were  said  to  be  “ABM”  (all  but  Minsky),  having  completed  all  course  work  and  exams  (and 
even,  in  at  least  one  case,  having  completed  the  dissertation!),  but  having  failed  to  deliver  an 
acceptable  term  paper  to  Minsky  (his  criterion  was  that  the  paper  should  be  “publishable”). 
Only  a very  few,  particularly  persistent  students  would  make  it  to  the  next  stage,  when 
Minsky  would  take  them  “under  his  wing”  and  treat  them  almost  like  family  members.  In  any 
case,  Minsky  was  probably  unusual  in  that  most  of  those  who  would  consider  themselves  to 
be  “students”  of  Minsky  in  the  intellectual  sense  were  not  students  in  the  more  formal  sense; 
and,  indeed,  his  influence  on  some  of  his  formal  students  (for  example,  Hall  and  Sargent)  is 
not  readily  apparent.  (However,  it  should  be  noted  that  Minsky  did  claim  these  “wayward” 
students  and  always  held  out  hope  that  some  day  their  conversion  would  be  complete.  During 
his  final  weeks  he  was  quite  convinced  that  Sargent  is undergoing  such  a transformation.) 
2.  See,  for  example,  King  (1996),  who  argues  that  Minsky  only  gradually  became  a Minskian; 
Lavoie  (1985,  1992)  argues  that  at  least  some  of  Minsky’s  work  (including  the  FIH  as  well  as 
38 his  early  work  that  concluded  the  credit  supply  curve  is  upward  sloping  with  respect  to  the 
interest  rate)  borders  on  neoclassical  loanable  funds  theory. 
3.  This  was  treated  as  a velocity-interest  rate  relation:  as  interest  rates  rise,  velocity  tends  to 
rise;  however,  innovations  can  shift  the  curve  out  so  that  velocity  can  increase  even  without 
an  increase  of  interest  rates.  For  monetary  policy  to  be  effective  in  slowing  an  expansion,  it 
would  have  to  decrease  reserves  so  much  that  it  would  compensate  for  rising  velocity  that 
would  result  from  the  tight  policy  (both  due  to  rising  interest  rates  and  due  to  innovations). 
4.  He  noted,  by  the  way,  that  “Case  D  of  course  is  similar  to  the  existing  monetary  system.” 
(Minsky  1957b,  p.  863) 
5.  He  concluded,  like  Keynes,  that  “[tlhere  does  not  seem  to  be  any  endogenous  factor  which 
would  lead  to  a  fall  in  liquidity  preference  on  a downswing.  Changes  in  liquidity  preference 
seem  to  be  destabilizing.”  (Minsky  1957b,  p.  882) 
6.  Although  published  in  1975,  this  book  was  finished  in  1972. 
7.  See,  for  example,  Minsky  (1980),  which  explicitly  incorporates  the  Kalecki  equation  into 
his  “financial  theory  of  investment”,  arguing  that  “The  fundamental  vision  in  this  argument  is 
that  private  employment  is  determined  by  profit  opportunities.  The  aggregate  profit 
opportunities  in  the  economy  are  in  the  skeletal  and  essential  analysis  determined  by 
investment  and  the  government  deficit.”  (Minsky  1980  [ 19821, p.  40) 
8.  See,  for  example,  Minsky  (1995)  and  (1996a). 
9.  We  will  also  abandon  any  attempt  to  present  his  development  of  the  FIH  in  a chronological 
fashion,  but  will  present  the  theory  at  a mature  stage  of  development.  Interested  readers 
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Lavoie  (1985,  1992)  argues  that  at  least  some  of  Minsky’s  work  (including  the  FIH  as  well  as 
38 10. We  can  see  how  the  FIH  continued  his  early  analysis  and  rejected  the  Harvard 
“Keynesian”  analysis.  In  contrast  to  the  conventional  multiplier-accelerator  analysis,  Minsky 
concluded  that  the  “free  market”  system  is  subject  to  explosive  oscillation  because  growth 
over  the  cycle  changed  behavioral  parameters  in  a way  that  promotes  instability.  However, 
imposition  of  institutional  floors  and  ceilings  can  maintain  a  semblance  of  stability. 
11.  Of  course,  balance  sheet  simplifications  still  occur,  but  “simplification”  at  one  institution 
is  not  normally  allowed  to  spread  to  others.  The  Savings  and  Loan  fiasco  and  bail-out  is  an 
example  of  a rather  massive  simplification  of  balance  sheets  as  assets  were  written-down  and 
liabilities  written-off. 
12. Note  the  connection  to  his  earlier  (1957b  and  1959)  articles. 
13.  See  Phillips  (1995)  for  a detailed  examination  of  the  narrow  banking  plan. 
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